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AsiaCities are central to the fight against climate change, but the IPCC recently noted that many cities — and partic-
ularly those in the developing world — lack the institutional, financial and technical capacities needed to switch
to low emission development paths. Based on detailed case studies of three Asian cities, this paper finds that the
adoption of low emission development strategies (LEDS) at the urban level could be economically attractive.
However, it also argues that without a coordinated multi-level, cross-sectoral governance framework these op-
portunities for low carbon urban development are likely to be left unexploited. As these governance conditions
are frequently not in place, we argue that these case study cities, and cities in similar contexts, are likely to
miss even the economically attractive low carbon development opportunities and become increasingly locked
in to higher cost, higher carbon development paths. Due to their growing size and importance, we conclude
that the presence or absence of governance arrangements that enable the adoption of low carbon development
strategies in Asian cities will have global implications for climate change.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cities must be central to global climate change mitigation and the
adoption of low emission development strategies (LEDS). Urban areas
are home to more than half of the world's population, are responsible
for around three quarters of global energy use and energy-related
greenhouse gas emissions and are growing rapidly (Gouldson et al.,
2015; IPCC, 2014; UN DESA, 2014; WHO, 2014). However, the IPCC
(2014) reports thatmany cities, and particularly those in the developing
world, lack thepoliticalwill and the institutional andfinancial capacities
needed to shift tomore energy and carbon-efficient development paths.
Many authors have emphasised the role that new governance
arrangements could play in enabling urban-level responses to climate
change (Acuto, 2013; Betsil & Bulkely, 2006; Corfee-Morlot et al.,
2009; Franzén, 2013; Matsumoto et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). There has
been a particular interest in multi-level governance arrangements that
might improve the fit and the interplay between actors and institutions
at the global, national, regional and local levels (Gouldson et al., 2015;
Matsumoto et al., 2014; Paavola, Gouldson, & Kluvankova-Oravska,
2009). Effective multi-level interactions across these scales are needed
because urban action on climate change is partly determined by policies.
. This is an open access article underand mechanisms introduced at higher scales — city plans are often
adopted to contribute to national climate mitigation strategies that are
themselves established in response to international frameworks and
agreements (Anguelovski & Carmin, 2011; Franzén, 2013; Schreurs,
2010).
Arguably, the cross-sectoral aspects of climate governance are
equally important at the city scale. Although some authors have ex-
plored the potential for integrating climate policy goals into sectors
such as energy, transport or housing at the national level (c.f. Adelle &
Russel, 2013), there have been very few analyses of the need for such
cross-sectoral coordination at the urban level. Without such coordi-
nation, climate policy may be left in the domain of relatively weak
environment departments and overlooked by the frequently more
powerful and better-resourced departments in municipal government.
The ‘mainstreaming’ of climate goals into the key areas of urban policy
is therefore critically important.
With the exception of China (c.f. Balme & Yi, 2014), Asian cities have
been largely neglected in research on governance for climatemitigation.
This is an important gap in light of Asia's immense importance to cli-
mate changemitigation efforts. Asia contributed 27%of global emissions
in 2011, or 30% if emissions from land use change and forestry are in-
cluded (WRI, 2014); moreover, its contribution to global emissions is
expected to increase significantly in the coming years in both absolute
and relative terms (IEA, 2013). The forecast increase in energy use andthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nomic and population growth that will be concentrated in urban cen-
tres. Cities in Asia are projected to absorb an additional billion people
over the next twenty-five years, which will demand huge investment
in housing, energy, transport and waste infrastructure (Puppim de
Oliveira et al., 2013). These investments provide an opportunity to pur-
sue aggressive urban LEDS— failing to take these opportunities will lead
to further lock in to costly, carbon-intensive development modes. The
urban planning decisions — or, in the many instances of unplanned or
ungoverned urban development, the ‘non-decisions’ (Crenson, 1971)
— made during this period are therefore critically important.
This paper explores the scope and options for urban LEDS in Asia by
examining opportunities for low carbon development in three cities:
Kolkata in India, Palembang in Indonesia and Johor Bahru in Malaysia.
These case study cities are not necessarily representative — they were
selected as they have been the focus of in-depth studies by the authors
on the economic case for low carbon investment — but understanding
trends and opportunities in these cities can generate insights that
have a wider relevance, particularly for other cities that are in com-
parable development contexts or that are facing similar governance
challenges within Asia. Key data for the three cities are provided in
Table 1.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section,we outline the
methodology used to identify trends in energy use and carbon emis-
sions and to evaluate the economic case for and potential impacts of
low carbon investment at the urban level. We then introduce the
three case studies. For each, we consider the relationship between
different levels of governance in each country, current patterns in ener-
gy use and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and the opportunities
for cost effective low carbon investment. We also discuss the cross-
sectoral nature of the challenge by highlighting the distribution of low
carbon development opportunities across sectors. We then compare
the findings for each city, and identify some of the barriers to the adop-
tion of urban LEDS. This underpins a discussion about mechanisms to
improve coordination across different levels of governance and tomain-
stream climate considerations into different spheres of policymaking.
We conclude by reflecting on the importance of building multi-level,
cross-sectoral climate governance frameworks if Asian cities are to
adopt and pursue urban LEDS.
2. Cases, approach and methods
A common methodology was adopted across the three case studies.
The methodology has three stages:
1. An assessment of trends in energy use and GHG emissions between
2000 and 2013 and of the implications of these trends continuing
to 2025.
2. An analysis of the scope for economically attractive low carbon in-
vestments in the electricity sectors serving each city over the next
decade (2015–2025), developed from a bottom-up evaluation of a
wide range of low carbon electricity generation measures.
3. An analysis of the scope for economically attractive low carbon in-
vestments in different sectors over the next decade (2015–2025),
developed from a bottom-up evaluation of a wide range of climate
mitigation measures.Table 1





Population 14.7 million 1.5 million 1.8 million
GDP per capita (USD) 2139 2940 14,790
Energy use per capita (kgoe) 243 861 2862
Emissions per capita (tCO2-e) 1.69 1.98 11.55
Energy bill (% of GDP) 9.1% 18.7% 15.2%Each of the studies considered energy use and emissions from the
metropolitan area, including those from direct consumption of fuels
and waste facilities within local authorities' reach (so-called Scope 1
emissions) and those produced while generating the electricity con-
sumed within the city (Scope 2 emissions). The studies therefore took
into account the energy mix, carbon intensity and the production and
transmission efficiencies of electricity supply. Due to lack of data, none
of the studies considered emissions from industrial processes (typically
included in Scope 1). We also did not include embedded energy or
carbon in the goods or services produced or consumed within the city
(Scope 3 emissions) due to the methodological complexities highlight-
ed by Macrotullio et al., (2012). Other research has found that account-
ing for embedded energy through consumption-based carbon accounts
is likely to reduce the carbon footprint of producer and exporter cities
and to increase the carbon footprint of consumer and importer cities
(Satterthwaite, 2008; Hoornweg et al., 2011; Gouldson et al., 2015).
The extent of the adjustments that would be required if embedded en-
ergy was taken into account is not clear, but due to the industrial and
export-oriented nature of the economies within which our case study
cities exist, it is likely our estimates of per capita emissions would be
lower if Scope 3 emissions were included (Davis & Caldeira, 2010).
Trends in energy use and emissions between 2000 and 2013 were
used to forecast trends to 2025. These projections assume that no addi-
tional climate and energy policies are introduced in this period, apart
from planned investments in electricity generation, transmission and
distribution, which are accounted for in the changing carbon intensity
of electricity between 2015 and 2025. The studies therefore assume
that growth in the different cities can continue in the near future as it
has in the recent past: for example, we project a consistent relationship
between growth in income per capita and rising levels of vehicle own-
ership and use. In practice,many citiesmight encounter structural limits
to growth such as gridlock in the transport system.
Longlists of low carbonmeasures that could be adopted in the hous-
ing, non-domestic buildings, transport, industry andwaste sectors were
then prepared for each city through extensive reviews of the academic,
policy and grey literatures.1 These lists included measures for the
household and non-residential buildings sectors including small-scale
renewables, improved building standards and more energy efficient
heating/cooling, lighting and appliances. For the transport sector they
included measures such as enhanced provision of different forms of
public and non-motorised transport and the adoption of more fuel-
efficient vehicles. For industry, a wide range of energy efficiency mea-
sures was included and for the waste sectormeasures such as enhanced
recycling and methane capture from landfill sites were considered. To
turn these longlists into shortlists, a process of iterative participatory
appraisal was utilised (see Fraser, Dougill, Mabee, Reed, & McAlpine,
2006) with stakeholder panels selecting themeasures that were appro-
priate to local conditions in each of the three cities.2
Preliminary estimates of the lifetime costs and benefits (expressed
as a net present value (NPV) calculation) of each shortlisted measure
were then generated using estimates derived from the grey and aca-
demic literature on its technical and economic performance. This eco-
nomic analysis considered only the private financial costs and benefits
of deployment in each context, comprising lifetime capital, running
and maintenance costs, compared with Business as Usual (BAU) prac-
tice. Again adopting a process of iterated participatory appraisal, these
estimates were reviewed and refined by stakeholder groups to ensure
that they were locally appropriate and as realistic and accurate as
possible. We adopted a standard real interest rate of 5% and assumed
an annual increase of 3% in real energy prices. Prices for measures
were held constant (at 2014 levels) without taking technological
learning in the low carbon sector into account, thereby making the1 The data sources used in the three studies are presented in Appendix A.
2 Full lists of the participants in the stakeholder panels that were drawn on in each of
the three cities are detailed in Appendix B.
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sures more conservative.
The estimates of GHGmitigation potential for each shortlisted mea-
sure were based on avoided emissions from substituting renewable
energy for fossil fuel generation, energy demand reduction through
efficiency improvements, or waste emissions avoided, relative to BAU
levels. We evaluated the potential scope for deploying each of the mea-
sures in the various sectors in the period to 2025 based on low carbon
programmes in comparable cities and consultations with local authori-
ties. These assessments took into account the life spans and replace-
ment rates of existing systems, which offer scopes to substitute more
energy or carbon-efficient alternatives, and also rates of change and
growth in the relevant sectors of the city. The estimated scopes for de-
ployment were subject to participatory review in expert workshops.
Finally, we drew together the results of our economic and carbon as-
sessments to determine the potential impact of exploiting all of the cost
effective measures (i.e. those with a positive NPV). These scenarios
allowed us to understand overall investment needs and paybacks, as
well as the potential emission reduction through the deployment of
economically attractive options. In developing these scenarios, we
recognise that some of the measures interact with each other so that
their performance will depend on whether/to what extent another op-
tion is also adopted. For example, the carbon savings frommore efficient
air conditioners depend on whether there are green building standards
in place. When wewere determining the potential savings across a sec-
tor or across the city economy, we calculated the effect of eachmeasure
on the potential energy savings of other measures to develop realistic
assessment of their combined impacts. For example, any carbon savings
frommore efficient air conditioners are deducted from the emission re-
ductions associated with green building standards.
2.1. Case study 1 — India and Kolkata
India has the largest aggregate energy demand in the world after
China and the United States, and demand is rising rapidly (Ahn &
Graczyk, 2012). However, per capita energy consumption in India re-
mains low. Though Indian energy is relatively carbon-intensive, per
capita emissions are only one third of the world and 14% of the OECD
averages (Ahn & Graczyk, 2012).
In international climate negotiations, India asserts that it must be
able to increase energy use per capita — and correspondingly, its
absolute levels of carbon emissions — to achieve inclusive growth and
eliminate poverty. Even so, the Government of India announced in
2010 that it would endeavour to reduce the (non-agricultural) emission
intensity of its GDP by 20–25% by 2020 in comparison to the 2005 level.
India's newwillingness to set climate targetswas influenced by growing
energy security concerns, increasing opportunities to access interna-
tional climate finance, growing public awareness of climate change vul-
nerability, the priorities of new political leadership and international
pressure (Isaksen & Stokke, 2014; Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2012;
Thaker & Leiserowitz, 2014).
At the national level, India's National Action Plan on Climate Change
explicitly focuses on development needs with ‘co-benefits for address-
ing climate change’, emphasising the relative importance of economic
growth for domestic policymakers (Atteridge, Shrivastava, Pahuja, &
Upadhyay, 2012). The Plan outlines eight climate strategies of which
four promote mitigation: (1) the National Solar Mission; (2) National
Mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency; (3) the National Mission on
Sustainable Habitat; and (4) the National Mission for a Green India
(Government of India, 2008). The National Action Plan remains the
guiding document for Indian climate policy (Pahuja, Pandey, Mandal,
& Bandyopadhyay, 2014), although the Five Year Plans effectively up-
date the policies and targets. The current Five Year Plan establishes,
for instance, additional renewable energy capacity targets of 13 GW of
hydropower, 5.3 GW of nuclear capacity, 15 GW of wind and 10 GW
of solar (Government of India, 2013).While most states are establishing climate action plans in response
to national directives, their ambition and effort varies substantially ac-
cording to their development agenda, climate vulnerability and the eco-
nomic opportunities associated with mitigation (Atteridge et al., 2012).
State-level participation in national schemes is also uneven: for exam-
ple,many states have not established credible renewable energy targets
despite a national goal of 15% (Shrimali, Tirumalachetty, & Nelson,
2012), while the Energy Conservation Building Code has only been im-
plemented in 8 of 29 states (Pahuja et al., 2014).
Different institutions are responsible for coordinating climate policy
in each state, including the Department of Science and Technology, the
State Pollution Control Boards and the Department of Environment.
These differences naturally shape the policy focus and instruments
adopted in each state (Atteridge et al., 2012). Climate change policies
still tend to overwhelmingly be sector-based rather than cross-
sectoral. For example, only a few local authorities have integrated
climate considerations into spatial planning in Indian cities (Kumar &
Geneletti, 2015).
Our case study city, Kolkata is the third largest city in India
(Demographia, 2013), with a population of 14.1 million in 2011
(Chandramouli, 2011). Although it is the economic hub of the Eastern
Region, there are stark inequalities in the city: one third of the popula-
tion lives in slums (Ghosh, 2013), where inhabitants lack access to grid
electricity, cleanwater, sanitation or adequate housing. Population den-
sity reaches 23,149 people/km2 in parts of the city (KMDA, 2007).
At the state level, the West Bengal Government has actively
decentralised governance to local councils, increasing the scope for
the Kolkata Municipal Development Agency to plan and manage
urban development. The focus in the City Development Plan is on
expanding housing through the construction of townships and tack-
ling congestion by building expressways and transit corridors
(KMDA, 2007). Despite Kolkata's vulnerability to climate change
(particularly rising sea levels and more extreme weather), mitigation
and adaptation have not meaningfully been mainstreamed into spatial
planning compared with other megacities in India such as Mumbai
and Delhi (Kumar & Geneletti, 2015). The West Bengal State Climate
Change Action Plan (Government of West Bengal, 2012) remains the
authoritative climate policy document for the city.
Within Kolkata, we find that emission intensity of GDP will fall by
35.2% between 2005 and 2020 — substantially higher than India's na-
tional target of 20–25% during the same period, and by 45% between
2005 and 2025. However, these relative benefits will be outweighed
by the absolute impacts of ongoing population and economic growth
in the coming years. We find that total GHG emissions from the city
grew by 38.5% between 2000 and 2014, and will grow by a further
52.0% (relative to 2014 levels) by 2025 under BAU conditions. With in-
dustrial development deliberately limited within the city boundaries,
the most significant source of consumption and growth is the residen-
tial sector (see Fig. 1).
The electricity supplied to Kolkata comes primarily from low-grade
coal generation with highly inefficient transmission and distribution
systems. This means that electricity is highly carbon-intensive — emis-
sion levels are ~1.5 tCO2/MWh, double best practice generation from
this type of coal (IEA, 2010). Some improvements in the carbon intensi-
ty of electricity supplied to Kolkata are possible through investments in
electricity systems.We estimate that retrofitting 6045MWof coal-fired
power generation in West Bengal could reduce emissions from the grid
by 11.6% by 2025 relative to BAU levels. Although we predict that this
would require investments of INR39.7 billion (USD679 million), these
would generate annual savings of INR18.2 billion (USD311.8 million)
thereby paying for themselves in c.2 years.
At the city level, we find that Kolkata could reduce its carbon emis-
sions by 20.7% in 2025 relative to BAU levels through economically at-
tractive investments within the city. This would require an investment
of INR119.3 billion (USD2.0 billion), which would generate annual sav-
ings of INR30.4 billion (USD0.52 billion). This package of investments
Fig. 1. Emissions (MtCO2-e) by sector for Kolkata, India, between 2000 and 2025.
The pronounced drop in emissions in 2008–2009 is partially a function of the global finan-
cial crisis and partially a function of new regulation requiring vehicles over fifteen years
old to be taken off the road.
Fig. 2. Emissions (MtCO2-e) by sector for Palembang, Indonesia, between 2000 and 2025.
The dramatic increase in industrial emissions in 2015–2016 is based on the anticipated
completion of a new fertiliser factory in the city.
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for the lifetime of the measures. While most of the economic savings
identifiedwere in the transport sectors— demandmanagement and ve-
hicle efficiency standards in particular — substantial carbon savings
were available in all sectors. Green building standards, more efficient
appliances and retrofitting residential buildings all proved to have sig-
nificant mitigation potential.
2.2. Case study 2 — Indonesia and Palembang
If emissions from land use change and forestry are taken into
account, Indonesia is one of the largest GHG emitters in the world
(National Climate Change Commission, 2010). Although it has the
fourth largest population, Indonesia's energy demand is the sixteenth
largest in the world. This illustrates both relatively low levels of energy
consumption per capita (18% of the OECD average) and the significant
potential for Indonesia's energy-related GHG emissions to increase
with population and economic growth.
Recent criticismof Indonesia's weak forest governance and opportu-
nities for international funding has led it to assume a relatively proac-
tive role in global climate negotiations (Resosudarmo, Ardiansyah, &
Napitupulu, 2013). It was among the first developing countries to
pledge emission reductions, committing at the Copenhagen Conference
of Parties “to materialise 26 to 41% CO2 equivalent emission reduction”
by 2020, relative to BAU levels (Government of Indonesia, 2010).
Indonesia's focus has been on reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation where it has large opportunities to attract inter-
national finance and technical assistance (National Climate Change
Commission, 2010). The international community and national govern-
ment have relatively neglected the massive increase in energy-related
emissions in Indonesia over the last decade (Resosudarmo et al., 2013).
At the national level, implementation of climate plans has been
lagging, partially due to competition among government ministries
(Resosudarmo et al., 2013). Regarding non-forestry emissions, the
Ministry of Environment, National Commission on Climate Change
and National Development Planning Agency all have legitimate claims
to lead cross-sectoral mitigation activities (Resosudarmo et al., 2013),
while the Ministries of Finance, Industry, Public Works and Transport
also have important roles to play (Murtiningtyas, 2012).
The energy sector is guided by the Energy Mix Policy, which sets a
target of 15% renewable energy generation by 2025. The National En-
ergy Agency has proposed to increase this to 25% by 2025 (Jupesta
et al., 2011), although this target includes ‘new energy’ such as coal liq-
uefaction and gasification (Director General of New and Renewable
Energy and Energy Conservation, 2011). Despite these targets, nationalpolicies continue to favour high carbon energy. Subsidies for diesel, ker-
osene and electricity continue, despite reforms to gasoline subsidies
(Sambijantoro, 2015), and regulatory frameworks continue to favour
coal over geothermal options (Smith, 2012).
It iswidely understood that, if Indonesia is to achieve its emission re-
duction targets, it will do so through improved forest governance rather
than by pursuing more carbon-efficient forms of urban or industrial
development. However, provinces in Indonesia are expected to develop
local Action Plans for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions that align
with the national Action Plan, but are tailored to local resources, oppor-
tunities and vulnerabilities. With the finalisation of these local Action
Plans, andwith climate change issues mainstreamed into provincial de-
velopment plans, local authorities will be responsible for implementa-
tion. National government agencies envision themselves providing
overall coordination, technical assistance and capacity development
(Murtiningtyas, 2012).
Sub-nationally, although Jakarta dominates the political and eco-
nomic landscape, Indonesia has thirteen cities with populations from
1 to 3 million. The relatively small populations and infrastructure
deficits facing these cities may offer their local authorities more scope
to pursue urban LEDS than Indonesia's singlemegacity.With its popula-
tion of 1.5 million, our case study city of Palembang is representative of
many of these second-tier cities. It is the capital of the state of South Su-
matra and a major port, and industrial hub for Indonesia. Significant in-
dustries include textiles, wood and paper products, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastic products, fabricated metals, and
machinery. While its economy is growing at rates of 6–7%, access to
electricity is unreliable, and consumption per capita remains low.
Rapid industrialisation combined with a growing vehicle fleet means
that air pollution and congestion pose severe problems.
Palembang is seeking national and international support to pursue
more sustainable development trajectories. The city has been selected
by the Ministry of Transport as one of three cities to showcase sustain-
able transport options. The city council is collaborating with German
Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ) to reduce air
pollution and with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
to improve solid waste management. The city council is therefore al-
ready seeking to mainstream environmental issues into development
planning.
Within Palembang, per capita energy consumption has been grow-
ing steadily in recent years, and is expected to accelerate between
2014 and 2025. When combined with rapid economic growth, particu-
larly in the industrial sector, this means that emissions from Palembang
have increased by 143.8% between 2000 and 2014, and are expected to
increase by a further 164.6% (relative to 2014 levels) in the period to
2025 if BAU trends continue (see Fig. 2). However, these increases will
be outstripped by economic growth: we project that the emission
Fig. 3. Emissions (MtCO2-e) by sector for Johor Bahru, Malaysia, between 2000 and 2025.
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(Colenbrander et al., 2015a).
To some extent, anticipated growth in emissions could be mitigated
through state-level investments in the electricity sector. Analysis of the
economic options for this sector suggest that it would be possible to in-
stall 1000 MW of geothermal power and to retrofit 514 MW of natural
gas-fired power plants in Sumatra. This would reduce emissions from
the grid by 12.2% by 2025 (relative to BAU levels). This would require
an investment of IDR35.0 trillion (USD2.9 billion), generating annual
savings of IDR2.3 trillion (USD175 million) so that the investments
would pay back in just over 15 years.
There is scope for proportionately larger emission reductions
through urban action. We find that Palembang could reduce its carbon
emissions by 24.1% in 2025 relative to BAU levels through economically
attractive investments. This would require an investment of IDR4.77
trillion (USD405.6 million), which would generate annual savings
of IDR5.14 trillion (USD436.80 million). The package of investments
would therefore pay for themselves in less than one year and continue
to generate annual savings for the lifetime of the measures. Nearly
half of this mitigation potential is in the industrial sector, where
different forms of fuel switching are among the most cost and carbon-
effective options. However, to encourage industry to move away from
carbon-intensive diesel-powered electricity generation will require
the provision of more reliable electricity supplies and this is largely
outside of the influence of the city itself. Subsidy reform proved very
economically attractive — although this could only be delivered by the
national government—while energy-from-waste options proved high-
ly carbon-effective.
2.3. Case study 3 — Malaysia and Johor Bahru
Malaysia's energy demand tripled between 1990 and 2010 so that it
nowhas the secondhighest energy demand per capita in Southeast Asia
after Brunei. Relatively high energy consumption per capita combined
with relatively carbon-intensive energy means that although its GDP
is c.60% of the OECD average its per capita carbon emissions are 76% of
the OECD average (World Bank, 2015).
In international negotiations on climate change, Malaysia has volun-
tarily committed to reduce the emission intensity of GDP by up to 40%
based on 2005 levels by 2020. However, the Malaysian government
has explicitly emphasised that any improvements in the emission inten-
sity of GDP are conditional on technology transfer and financial support
from Annex I countries, and that climate action is secondary to contin-
ued development (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment,
2010: XIV).
Malaysia's stance on climate change is significant because it is argu-
ably the most economically advanced of the rapidly industrialising
countries in Southeast Asia. There is therefore a risk that its large and
fast-growing neighbours (Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam) will emu-
late its energy- and carbon-intensive development path. Malaysia's re-
luctance to take a leadership role in international climate negotiations
may be attributed in part to its large fossil fuel reserves. Oil-related rev-
enue contributed 40% of total government revenue in 2010 (Economic
Planning Unit, 2010), and the country is projected to remain a net oil
and gas exporter until 2035 (Rahim & Liwan, 2012).
Domestically, Malaysia is currently expanding electricity generation
capacity in order tomeet growing demand, with significant planned in-
vestments in coal-fired and nuclear power plants (Khor & Lalchang,
2014). While energy efficiency and renewable energy are relatively
cost effective, the government is not meaningfully pursuing these
options (Oh, Lalchand, & Chua, 2014). Instead, Malaysia maintained
generous subsidies for fossil fuels until 2014, which reduced the incen-
tives to conserve energy or invest in clean energy.
The current Malaysia Plan (2011–2015) establishes or maintains a
number of national low carbon programmes. These include a renewable
energy target of 985MWby 2015 (5.5% of installed capacity), facilitatedby a feed-in tariff; an energy efficiency target of 4000 ktoe per year by
2015, prioritising more efficient lighting, appliances and buildings;
and the construction of energy-from-waste infrastructure (Economic
Planning Unit, 2010). Mitigation measures are therefore sectorally fo-
cused (Khailani & Perera, 2013) and insignificant relative to, for exam-
ple, the expansion of installed coal-fired capacity by 3.4 GW between
2008 and 2013 (Oh et al., 2014).
At a local scale, urban development inMalaysia is governed by the
Federal Department of Town and County Planning, while most miti-
gation actions are sectoral and directed by the relevant government
agency. Local action plans must align with state and national plans
(Khailani & Perera, 2013). The centralised governance structures
mean that low carbon action at a local or regional level is often driven
by the national government: for example, the cities of Putrajaya and
Cyberjaya have been developed by national government to showcase
low carbon cities in Malaysia (Ministry of Energy, Green Technology
and Water, 2012).
Several Malaysian cities and regions are pursuing climate mitigation
actions within the frameworks of the National Physical Plan and State
Structure Plan (Ho, Matsuoka, Simson, & Gomi, 2013). Foremost
among these is the Iskandar Malaysia Special Economic Corridor,
which has set an emission intensity reduction target of 50% by 2025 rel-
ative to 2005 levels (UTM, IRDA, & Kyoto University, Okayama Universi-
ty, National Institute for Environmental Studies, 2012). The cities of
Johor Bahru and Pasir Gudang are ‘flagship zones’ in Iskandar
Malaysia. These closely linked cities had a combined population of 1.8
million in 2014, growing at approximately 4% per year (AECOM,
2009). Manufacturing contributes 45% of GDP in the Southern Johor
Economic Corridor, dominated by the electrical and electronics, petro-
and oleo-chemical and agro-processing industries (IRDA, 2006). Johor
Bahru is also emerging as a commercial and services centre, while
Pasir Gudang is an important port.
Within Johor Bahru, our analysis suggests that the city will cut the
carbon intensity of GDP by 69.8% between 2000 and 2025 under BAU
conditions, outstripping regional or national targets. However, despite
improvements in emission intensity, we find that the absolute level of
emissions produced by Johor Bahru increased by 317.6% between
2005 and 2014, and will increase by a further 83.8% (relative to 2014
levels) by 2025 if BAU trends continue (see Fig. 3) (Colenbrander et
al., 2015b).
There is limited potential for emission reductions from electricity
generation in Peninsular Malaysia as major investments in coal-fired
electricity supply — with capacity to meet growing energy needs
for many years — have already been made. However, we find that
installing 600 MW of natural gas-fired power plants equipped with
the best available technologies and replacing 2000 MW of natural
gas and 120 MW of diesel power plants with solar photovoltaic
panels would be cost effective. These measures would reduce
16 A. Gouldson et al. / Cities 54 (2016) 11–19emissions from the grid by 2% by 2025 (relative to BAU levels), re-
quire an investment of MRY23 billion (USD6.9 billion), generate an-
nual savings of MYR1.9 million (US$576 million) and pay back the
investment in 12 years.
At the city level, we find a substantial scope to reduce emissions. Our
analysis suggests that Johor Bahru could reduce its carbon emissions by
24.2% in 2025 (relative to BAU levels) through economically attractive
investments. This would require an investment of MYR3.33 billion
(USD1.01 billion), which would generate annual savings of MYR2.56
billion (USD0.77 billion). This package of investments would pay for it-
self in 1.3 years and continue to generate annual savings for the lifetime
of the measure. Over half of the emission savings potential for Johor
Bahru relate to the transport sector, where the most cost effective op-
portunities relate to the promotion of hybrid andmore fuel-efficient ve-
hicles and the adoption of new traffic management schemes. The most
carbon-effective options relate to new fuel standards.
3. Comparative analysis and discussion
The analysis presented above shows that GHG emissions are rising
rapidly in all three of the case study cities. Yet structural changes in
the city economies and background trends in energy efficiency are lead-
ing to significant improvements in energy and carbon intensity. The
Indian government has stated that it will endeavour to reduce the emis-
sion intensity of its GDP by 20–25% by 2020 in comparison with the
2005 level. This analysis shows that Kolkata will reduce its emission in-
tensity by 35.2% over this period even under BAU conditions. Similarly,
the Malaysian government has committed to reduce the emission in-
tensity of GDP by up to 40% based on 2005 levels by 2020 while the
analysis shows that Johor Bahru will reduce its emissions by 63.5%
over this period under BAU conditions. Although the Indonesian gov-
ernment has not offered specific emission intensity reduction targets,
Palembang is on track to reduce the carbon intensity of GDP by 30.9%.
These city-level achievements under BAU conditions and without in-
vestment in low carbonmeasures such as those analysed above suggest
that national climate commitments are readily achievable and lack
ambition. Even if governments choose only to exploit those options
that are economically attractive, our results demonstrate that there is
a substantial scope to attain further improvements in carbon intensity
by implementing LEDS in Asian cities.
In all three instances, cost effective low carbon options are readily
apparent across the different sectors. In the electricity sector, the results
show that there is untapped potential to decarbonise supply to each of
the three case study cities. The unbroken lines in Fig. 4 show the carbon
intensity of grid electricity consumed by each city under BAU condi-
tions. It is apparent that there are no planned investments that willFig. 4. The carbon intensity of the electricity grid serving each city between 2000 and 2025
under BAU conditions (unbroken line) and with the deployment of economically attrac-
tive low carbon measures (dashed line).significantly reduce the carbon intensity of grid electricity in these cities,
and that the expansion of coal-fired power plants supplying the Suma-
tra grid will actually increase the carbon intensity of electricity con-
sumed in Palembang. However, the dashed lines in Fig. 4 show the
potential carbon intensity of grid electricity with the implementation
of economically attractive low carbonmeasures in the electricity sector.
These investments would reduce emissions from electricity generation
by 11% in West Bengal, 12% in Sumatra and 2% in Peninsula Malaysia.
The provision of more reliable, lower carbon electricity would also
enable cities in each region to explore a wider range of mitigation
options. However, the governance arrangements that are needed to
exploit these options are lacking in each context.
In Malaysia, delivering low carbonmeasures in the electricity sector
would need coordinated action among four federal agencies and imple-
mentation by the utility company Tenaga Nasional Berhad (Chua & Oh,
2010). In Indonesia, the national Ministry of Energy and Mineral Re-
sources and the state Ministry for Environment combine to govern the
public electricity utility PLN (Indriyanto et al., 2006). In India, the elec-
tricity sector was historically the responsibility of vertically integrated
state-owned monopolies such as the West Bengal State Electricity
Board but recent reforms have shifted power to national policymakers
(particularly the Ministry of Power) and regulators who oversee what
are now disaggregated and liberalised energy markets. In all instances
then, responsibilities are spread between different ministries and agen-
cies and across multiple levels. Climate action for the electricity sector
requires multi-level, inter-agency coordination.
Within the cities studied, our results also indicate that there is a sig-
nificant scope to reduce carbon emissions (relative to BAU trends)
through exploiting economically attractive low carbon options. As is
shown in Fig. 5, the rate of increase of emissions from each city could
be reduced significantly through cost effective options in the residential,
commercial, transport, industry and waste sectors. The most economi-
cally attractive options in each city are presented in Table 2 — as can
be seen they include a range of different measures that need to be ap-
plied across all of the different sectors.
To enable the widespread adoption of these measures, policy in-
terventions are likely to be needed from national, state and local gov-
ernments and from policy areas including energy, finance, housing,
transport, land use planning and economic development. Raising
awareness and securing support for the promotion of the different
elements of LEDS from these multiple and at times competing policy
domains are a major challenge in all contexts, but it is especially pro-
nounced at the urban level in the contexts considered here. There are
some instanceswheremunicipal governments have the powers needed
to intervene effectively, but there are many others where the powers
are absent, are under-developed or are diffused and fragmented.Fig. 5. GHG emissions from each city between 2000 and 2025 under BAU conditions (un-
broken line) and with the deployment of economically attractive low carbon measures
(dashed line).
Table 2
The five most carbon-effective options in each city.
City Measureb Carbon savings
(ktCO2-e)
Kolkata, India Adopting green building standards for 100% of
new buildings in the commercial
6768
Deploying the most energy efficient air
conditioners currently available in the domestic
sector
6003
Retrofitting fibreglass urethane roofs for 20% of
existing households
4989
Deploying more energy efficient air
conditioners than BAU in the domestic sector
3688
Deploying the most energy efficient





Replacing diesel with biodiesel in industry 7048
Supplementing diesel boilers with solar water
heaters
6730
Promoting landfill gas utilisation 3802
Promoting energy-from-waste (combined heat
and power)
3414
Promoting energy efficiency in the fertiliser




Replacing diesel with biodiesel in industrya 43,798
a Biofuel is assumed to be carbon-neutral in this analysis. This would demand effective
supply chain management.
b Where two mutually exclusive options are among the top five, the less carbon-effec-
tive has been removed from this list.
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and cross-sectoral governance arrangements is especially apparent
in the area of transport policy and planning. In Malaysia, as in many
other contexts, only national government has the financial capacity
and legislative authority to mandate or to offer either tax incentives
to promote the up-take of more efficient or hybrid cars. Historically,
however, transport policy at the national level in Malaysia has pro-
moted vehicle sales in an effort to support the national automobile
industry (Barter, 2004). Local and regional governments can lay the
groundwork for investments in bicycle lanes or Bus Rapid Transport
systems by conducting feasibility studies and preparing spatial
plans, but individual authorities often do not have sufficient capacity
or incentive to coordinate across metropolitan areas (OECD, 2014).
While the five municipal authorities within Johor Bahru have com-
pleted a pioneering collaborative Local Plan, an integrated transport
authority could enable new forms of policy and planning and help
unlock new financial resources at the city scale (Hall & Jonas, 2014).
The adoption of an integrated transport authority and the policy inte-
gration that it could enable would also require support from national
government.
In Palembang, experiences in the waste sector highlight the need
to consider broader governance capacities. Some of the most eco-
nomically attractive low carbon measures, such as waste prevention
and composting, require active support fromnon-state actors, particular-
ly businesses and households if they are to be adopted. The ability of the
severely resource constrained waste management department in the
municipal government to engage and to secure such support is extremely
limited. Other economically attractive measures, such as energy-from-
waste and landfill gas utilisation, require significant upfront capital
expenditure and close cooperation with the national electricity utility.
As well as collaborating with state and national government within
Indonesia, Palembang City Council has partnered with the Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency to develop local ordinances and policy capac-
ity for better waste management (JICA, 2015), and has established a
landfill gas flaring project that generates carbon credits through the
CleanDevelopmentMechanism (CDM, 2009). This demonstrates how in-
ternational multi-level governance and finance can help build theinstitutional capacity to deliver LEDS at the local scale, whether through
a regulatory or project-based approach.
In Kolkata, the municipal authorities and development agencies
have been able to build institutional capacities for action in areas such
aswaste management as the powers in these areaswere both devolved
to the municipal level and concentrated in departments that were able
to sign up to a low carbon agenda. In other areas though powers were
spread across different departmental or functional boundaries, and
path-dependencies meant that departments were more likely to sup-
port higher carbon than lower carbon development paths. In transport
planning for example, ongoing commitments to road building limited
the potential to support public and non-motorised transport modes
more effectively. In other instances, most notably for electricity supply,
the power to influence was not concentrated at the city scale, and mu-
nicipal agencies depended on state and national level policies and
wider market conditions over which they had very little influence.
Multi-level governance arrangements were more of a top-down than
a bottom-up nature and so the capacity to adopt key aspects of urban
LEDS was restricted.
All of these examples show that cities alone frequently lack the ca-
pacity to push forward with climate change mitigation, even when
there are significant co-benefits at the local level. In some instances,
they might be able to ‘cherry pick’ particularly attractive and accessible
low carbon measures that fall within the sphere of influence of a single
department and that are relatively simple to implement. But their ca-
pacity to go further is frequently dependent on support from acrossmu-
nicipal government, from higher levels of government and from non-
state actors and agencies. In the absence of such governance arrange-
ments, Asian cities such as those studied are likely to continue with
business as usual modes of development, even when technically viable
and economically attractive alternatives are readily available. This high-
lights the view that tackling climate change is a political and institution-
al rather than a technological or economic challenge.
4. Conclusions
Given their growing scale and significance, Asian cities will have to
be active in the global fight against climate change if it is to be effective.
However, as is frequently the case in the global South, there are many
other pressing priorities for local governments with limited resources
and capacities. However, by focusing on three case study cities in Asia,
we have highlighted thepresence of substantial economic opportunities
to deploy low carbon measures at the city scale. Municipal authorities
therefore have a significant scope to pursue urban LEDS in ways that
will also foster economic development.Moreover, low carbon initiatives
at the city scale could generate knowledge and innovations that can
havewider economic and social benefits, in addition to inspiring climate
action in other cities and at a national scale.Whether cities exploit these
opportunities depends significantly on the governance conditions that
are in place. The multiple policy levers that need to be pulled to access
these opportunities exist at different scales and in different sectors.
Although the cities have some freedom to act, particularly in contexts
of decentralised governance, their capacity to act could be significantly
enhanced with more supportive and effective multi-level governance
arrangements. Without more coordination between international, na-
tional, regional and local institutions, integration into different sectoral
priorities and policies, and engagement between the public, private
and civic sectors it seems likely that cities in Asia will lock in more
fully to high-cost, high carbon development paths. Because of the global
significance of Asian cities, this would substantially affect our collective
ability to avoid dangerous levels of climate change.
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